Partner Favorability and Acquisition Premia in Cross-Border M&A's by 변종민
 
 
저 시-비 리- 경 지 2.0 한민  
는 아래  조건  르는 경 에 한하여 게 
l  저 물  복제, 포, 전송, 전시, 공연  송할 수 습니다.  
다 과 같  조건  라야 합니다: 
l 하는,  저 물  나 포  경 ,  저 물에 적 된 허락조건
 명확하게 나타내어야 합니다.  
l 저 터  허가를 면 러한 조건들  적 되지 않습니다.  
저 에 른  리는  내 에 하여 향  지 않습니다. 




저 시. 하는 원저 를 시하여야 합니다. 
비 리. 하는  저 물  리 목적  할 수 없습니다. 




경영학 석사 학위논문 
 
Partner Favorability and Acquisition 
Premia in Cross-Border M&A’s 
 
 
국경 간 인수합병에서 상대기업 호감도가  








경영학과 경영학 전공 




In this paper, we examined the linkage between a firm’s sentiment 
toward the national identity of its acquisition partner and the acquisition 
premium paid. Using a sample of 435 cross-border M&A’s in 38 countries, 
we found that the acquisition premium is negatively associated with: 1) the 
degree of favorability the acquiring firm holds toward its target firm’s 
national identity; and 2) the degree of favorability the target firm holds 
toward its acquiring firm’s national identity. In addition, information 
asymmetricity was shown to moderate the relationship between the 
acquirer's favorability of the target firm and the acquisition premium. 
Specifically, the acquiring firms tend to rely more on their subjective 
favorability in unrelated acquisitions in which they lack information on the 
target firm. In sum, our results shed new insight on the effects of subjective 
favorability of national identities on acquisition premia in the context of 
cross-border M&A’s. 
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1. Introduction 
A cross-border acquisition is an efficacious strategy that serves 
multiple functions at the strategic level, including providing an entry to a 
foreign market and procuring critical assets (Björkman, Stahl & Vaara, 2007; 
Shimizu, Hitt, Vaidyanath & Pisano, 2004). Among all facets of cross-border 
acquisitions, many researchers have been interested in the topic of 
acquisition premium in particular. After all, it is a critically important 
element in cross-border acquisition, which can also substantially affect post-
acquisition performances (Krishnan, Hitt & Park, 2007; Laamanen, 2007; 
Sirower, 1997). For instance, excessive acquisition premium leads to 
negative returns to shareholders, poor post-acquisition performance, and 
even bankruptcy (Hayward & Hambrick, 1997; Lubatkin, 1983; 
Trachtenberg, Meinbardis & Hiller, 1990; Varaiya & Ferris, 1987; Walking & 
Edmister, 1985). 
In the extant literature, there are two streams of research that can 
explicate the nature of cross-border acquisition premia. The first stream 
focuses on the deal-specific factors that influence acquisition premium. For 
example, Nielsen and Melicher (1973) found that acquisition premium is 
positively associated with the magnitude of potential synergy between the 
acquirers and target firms. Slusky and Caves (1991) also found that 
acquisition premia increase with financial synergy, as well as existence of 
rival bidders. Furthermore, based on stock market misvaluations of the 
combining firms, Shleifer and Vishny (2003) found that relative valuation of 
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target firms and the market's perception of the synergies also determine 
acquisition premia. In a recent study, Alexandridis, Fuller, Terhaar and 
Travlos (2013) also discovered a positive relationship between the size of the 
target firms and the excessive premia paid for the acquisitions.  
The second branch of research focuses on the cognitive factors that 
give arise to acquisition premia. For instance, Hayward and Hambrick (1997) 
examined the top managers’ cognitive process of determining acquisition 
primia by focusing on the role of CEO hubris. In addition, Haunschild (1994) 
showed the influences of inter-organizational ties on the acquirers’ bidding 
price when the value of acquisition target is uncertain. Furthermore, 
drawing from the theories in behavioral learning and risk taking, Kim, 
Haleblian, and Finkelstein (2011) demonstrated that when managers are 
desperate for growth, they tend to pay higher acquisition premia to acquire 
the target firms.  
Despite the plethora of studies on this topic, researchers have yet to 
examine acquisition premia in the context of cross-border acquisitions. 
Given that the fastest segment in recent M&A market is in cross-border 
transactions (Armstrong, 2015; Hammond, Baigorri & Browning, 2015), this 
is a glaring gap in the literature. Since a cross-border M&A involves 
consolidation of two distant organizations with distinct national identities, 
examining the linkage between the dynamics of the interplay by the two 
partners would offer a greater insight on acquisition premium in global 
M&A’s. In particular, the role of favorability toward national identities in 
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cross-border acquisitions has never been studied. In this paper, we attempt 
to fill this gap by examining whether and how the perception of foreign 
countries affects an M&A transaction based on a sample of 435 cross-border 
acquisitions from 38 countries. The following are our main research 
questions:  
1) How does an acquirer's attitude toward the national identity of 
the target firm affect the acquisition premium paid? 
2) How does a target firm’s attitude toward the national identity of 
the acquirer affect the acquisition premium paid? 
3) How does the interaction of the mutual attitudes toward the 
national identity between the acquisition partners affect the acquisition 
premium paid? 
4) How does information symmetricity moderate the relationship 
between acquisition parties’ attitude toward the national identity of their 
partners in the context of the acquisition premia? 
Our results show that the acquisition parties’ sentiments in the 
context of national identities do affect cross-border acquisitions. We found 
that the acquisition premium is significantly associated with perceived 
favorability of the partner firm’s national identity, from perspectives of both 
the acquirer and the target. Specifically, a favorable sentiment of an acquirer 
toward its target firm’s national identity is negatively associated with 
acquisition premium. Furthermore, we also found equally compelling set of 
results from the target firm’s perspective: A target’s favorable attitude 
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toward the national identity of its acquirer firm is negatively related with 
acquisition premium. In addition, the results showed that the relationship 
between the acquirer’s favorability of its target and acquisition premium is 
amplified by information asymmetricity. In other words, the acquiring firms 
tended to rely more on their subjective favorability in unrelated acquisitions 
in which they lack information on the target firm.  
To date, researchers have not yet considered the impact of 
subjective favorability between acquisition partners on the acquisition 
premium. In our study, we attempt to fill this gap by examining the 
dynamics between an acquirer and its target firm in terms of their mutual 
favorability (or lack thereof) and show that it can serve as a potential asset 
(or a liability) in cross-border interfirm transactions. In addition, our study 
is the first to empirically focus on the role of information asymmetricity on 
such dynamics. 
In the following sections, we develop several hypotheses based on 
the existing literature; we then test them empirically and report the results. 
In the final section, we discuss our findings and offer suggestions for the 
future studies. 
 
2. Theory and Hypothesis 
In the extant literature on within-border M&A’s, scholars have paid 
much attention to analyzing the organizational distance between the 
partners as both antecedents and outcomes of a merger (Bauer & Matzler, 
5 
2014; Datta, 1991). Similarly, researchers of cross-border M&A’s have also 
considered the role of cultural, administrative & political, geographic, and 
economic distances on firm-level behaviors and performances (Björkman et 
al., 2007; Ghemawat, 2001; Lee, 2008; Reus & Lamont, 2009; Shenkar, 2001;). 
Although researchers are cognizant of the differences between the two 
parties engaged in an acquisition, however, the variances in mutual 
perception or attitude toward their respective partner firms have been less 
examined. What happens if one of the two parties about to undergo an 
acquisition harbor a particular sentiment/stereotype toward the other firm? 
How does a strong (dis)favorability of an acquirer toward the target 
influence the reservation price it is willing to pay for the acquisition? 
Relatedly, how does a strong (dis)favorability of a target toward the 
acquirer influence its reservation price for the acquisition? In this study, we 
explore how varying degrees of favorability or perception based on national 
identities influence an M&A between two firms. Specifically, we examine 
the firms’ attitude toward their partners and their national identities in the 
context of the acquisition premium paid. Acquisition premium is 
determined at the very initial stage of an M&A and holds a significant 
impact on the combined firm’s post-M&A performances (Haunschild 1994; 
Laamanen, 2007). 
In recent years, a few researchers of M&A’s have suggested that 
national-level characteristics can be projected to firms’ organizational level 
and affect the acquisition premia. For example, Weitzel and Berns (2006) 
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found that the level of corruption in the host countries was positively 
associated with acquisition premia. Hope, Thomas and Vyas (2011) showed 
how the dominance of national pride in developing countries affect their 
bids in cross-border acquisitions. In addition, Kiyamaz (2004) found a 
strong relationship between acquisition premia and the national 
geolocations of the acquisition partners. In sum, previous researchers have 
demonstrated that national-level characteristics do influence firms 
undergoing an acquisition.  
However, those national-level characteristics were limited to one-
sided sentiment or firm specific sentiment. They have merely focused on 
either acquirer or target's sentiment without looking into both sides. Also, 
they haven't discussed general sentiment of the firm such as favorability of 
national identities. Instead, they have only dealt with firm-specific 
sentiment such as corruption, national pride, and geolocation. Favorability 
of a national identity is a holistic attitude that encompasses all sentiments 
toward every aspect of the nation’s influence including the country’s culture, 
military power, politics, and economy (Nye, 2004; Nye, 2011), Thus, we can 
argue that favorability of a national identity can be an appropriate concept 
to investigate a comprehensive effect of being a member of a specific nation 
on acquisition premia in the context of cross-border M&As. Acquisitions are 
inherently influenced by cognitive processes (Haunschild, 1994; Hayward & 
Hambrick, 1997). Therefore, we expect that perception of different national 
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identities and attraction toward acquisition parties would also impact cross-
border acquisitions.  
 
2.1 Favorability of National Identity: The Acquirer’s 
Perspective 
In undertaking a cross-border acquisition, a firm signals its 
willingness to work closely with substantial number of managers and 
workers from the target firm (Chakrabarti, Gupta-Mukherjee & Jayaraman 
2009; Morosini, Shane & Singh, 1998). Employees of the acquiring firm 
would need to accommodate the distinct cultural characteristics of the 
target firm and vice-versa (Larsson & Finkelstein, 1999). Therefore, it is 
reasonable to assume that an acquirer would be more willing to purchase a 
target firm associated with more favorable national identity. If the national 
identity of the target firm is perceived as favorable, it would increase the 
reservation price the acquirer is willing to pay for the target; in turn, the 
acquisition premium paid in the transaction would increase accordingly. 
Moreover, the extant literature has shown that acquisition markets are also 
driven by supply-demand relationships; a greater number of bidders 
interested in the target firm tend to lead to higher acquisition premia 
(Shelton, 2000; Varaiya, 1987; Walking & Edmister, 1985). In other words, as 
the general favorability of the target firm increases, the price---and the 
premium---of an acquisition deal would tend to increase as well. In fact, the 
extant literature on the behaviors of the ‘white knight’ acquirers have 
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shown that favorability of the target firms leads to over-bidding and higher 
acquisition premia. Specifically, ‘white knight’ acquirers, relatively 
friendlier than the other counterparts, tend to over-bid during the process of 
acquisition price offering to outbid their competitors (Carroll & Griffith, 
1999; Niden, 1993).  
In the field of political science, the notion of favorability of national 
identities has increasingly attracted the attention of researchers. As a 
renowned political scientist, Joseph Nye coined the term, ‘soft power’, to 
refer to the ability of a nation to elicit attraction from people of foreign 
countries through the nation’s various non-physical impacts including 
social, economic, cultural influences (Nye, 2004). For example, the regional 
hegemony China holds in Asia is attributed partly to her distinct Confucius 
culture that dominates its numerous Asian neighbors (Paradise, 2009). As it 
refers to a nation’s capability to attract attention of foreign countries, the 
notion of soft power offers potential to examine various issues related to the 
perception or favorability of a nation by foreigners (Datta, 2009).  
At the organizational level, soft power associated with a firm’s 
country of origin is likely to affect its performance abroad (Bräutigam & 
Nye, 2004; Xiaoyang, 2012). For instance, despite its major success in most of 
Asian countries, the popular music industry in Korea encountered major 
setback when anti-Korean sentiment broke out in Japan in recent years 
(Park, 2014). In addition, due to recently rising anti-Americanism in Russia, 
McDonald’s in Russia has publically highlighted its local Russian ties to 
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fend off its stereotypical image of the symbol of America (Birnbaum, 2015). 
As such, soft power or other perceptions of foreign nations would affect 
firm-level behaviors and performance outcomes considering the significant 
impact of the sentiment toward different nations.  
The literature in marketing also provides some theoretical basis for 
the role of national identity in acquisition premium as it provides 
implications that are consistent with the theories from the soft power. 
Specifically, researchers have found that in consumer goods industries, 
national identities associated with products, vis-à-vis their country of origin, 
influence consumers’ evaluation. Such behavioral tendency of linking the 
inherent quality of the product and the perceived favorability of its 
origination is referred to as “the country-of-origin effect” (Bilkey & Nes, 
1982; Gürhan-Canli & Maheswaran, 2000). In fact, manifestation of such 
effect is frequently observed across different countries (Han & Terpstra, 
1988; Peterson & Jolibert, 1995; Roth & Romeo, 1992). For example, the 
country-of-origin effect can explain why ordinary Chinese consumers are 
reluctant to purchase Japanese vehicles after anti-Japanese sentiments have 
surged in recent years (Murphy, 2014). Consumers tend to hold positive 
images of a product from a particular foreign country if the latter is 
associated with positive images (Hong & Wyer, 1989; Maheswara, 1994). 
Such the-country-of-origin effect, however, has only been studied in the 
field of consumer behavior and has never been systematically examined in 
the field of strategic management, and in particular, on the topic of M&A’s. 
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Drawing from such literature, we argue that acquirers would be 
willing to pay excessive acquisition premium for target firms associated 
favorable national identities. Based on this logic, we offer the following 
hypothesis under the ceteris paribus assumption: 
 
Hypothesis 1: The level of favorability an acquirer holds toward a 
national identity of the target firm is positively related to the 
acquisition premium. 
 
2.2 Favorability of National Identity: The Target’s 
Perspective 
Being acquired by another firm substantially affects the post-merger 
organizational culture and working environment of the target firm 
(Krishnan et al., 2007; Krug & Hegarty, 1997). As such, selecting an acquirer 
whose cultural norms and values are compatible would be a crucial factor in 
achieving a successful post-acquisition integration. Therefore, ceteris paribus, 
a target firm would prefer to be acquired by another company based in a 
foreign country with more favorable national identity. Although some may 
argue that a target firm’s sentiment toward its acquirer is irrelevant, 
especially if its willingness to undergo an acquisition is high, several 
anecdotal evidences point out that target firms do take measures to 
discourage unattractive buyers from buying their firms. For example, 
Netflix took company-wide measures to fend off Carl Icahn and his 
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investment firm in 2012 (Goldman, 2012). Existing literature have 
demonstrated such defensive traits of target firms by analyzing the effect of 
poison pill on acquisition premium. Haunschild (1994) notes that a poison 
pill is “a firm-level defense against unwanted takeover.” Poison pill arises 
when target firms try to discourage unfavorable buyers and fend off the 
unappealing candidates with unattractive price (Malatesta, 1988).  
Given that target firms take proactive actions to prevent themselves 
from being purchased by unattractive buyers, as seen in the example of 
poison pills, we can conclude that target firms can hold different levels of 
favorability toward their potential buyers and, subsequently, discriminate 
their potential buyers accordingly. As a result, such sentiments would affect 
acquisition premium. For instance, target firms would suggest or accept 
lower acquisition price with acquirers with more attractive countries of 
origin. Therefore, we offer the following hypothesis: 
 
Hypothesis 2: The level of favorability a target firm holds toward a 
national identity of the acquirer is negatively related to the 
acquisition premium. 
 
2.3 The Interaction Effects between Favorability of 
National Identity: The Acquirer and the Target firms 
If both acquirers and target firms were indeed influenced by their 
sentiments toward their acquisition partners’ national identities, the 
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interaction effect between the sentiments of the two sides would exist. 
Moreover, such interaction effect is probably more apparent when the 
sentiments that acquirers and targets hold toward each other are 
asymmetric. For example, if an acquirer were favorable of the target firm 
based on its national identity, while the target firm is unfavorable of the 
acquirer’s, both the acquirer and the target would simultaneously raise the 
price of the deal during the negotiation, giving arise to a rapid increase in 
bid price. On the other hand, if an acquirer is unfavorable of the target 
firm’s national identity while the target firm is favorable of its acquirer’s 
country of origin, the equilibrium price would be lower as both the acquirer 
and the target would decrease the price of the deal concurrently. As a result, 
we propose the following hypothesis: 
 
Hypothesis 3: The favorability of a target weakens the relationship 
between the favorability of the acquirer and the acquisition premium. 
 
In order to test the interaction effect, we need to assume that the 
sentiments of the two acquisition sides are independent from each other. An 
exhaustive review of the literature gave no indication that the favorability 
ratings from different countries were related to each other. Moreover, 
according to the BBC, Globescan and PIPA’s country ratings survey (2012), 
which we utilized to measure favorability of foreign nations, individual 
sentiments toward other countries are mostly products of the traditional, 
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cultural, political, and economic aspects of the country, rather than the 
reciprocal perception of the focal nation (BBC, 2012). As a result, based on 
the survey data and absence of past research to prove dependence among 
sentiments toward other countries, we assumed that an acquirer’s attitude 
toward the target firm’s national identities is orthogonal to the target’s 
attitude toward the acquirer. Such assumption made the empirical analysis 
of the interaction effect possible, which will be explained in the later section. 
 
2.4 The Moderating Effects of Information Asymmetricity 
As previously discussed, evaluation of a subject can be significantly 
affected by its association of a specific national identity. The extant research 
in psychology indicates that such cognitive trait of association becomes 
more salient if we are inundated with too little or excessive information on 
the subject (Celsi & Olson, 1988; Hong & Wyer, 1989; Huber & McCann, 
1982). In other words, people tend to infer information about a subject more 
through the process of association if they are more unfamiliar with the 
subject. Thus, we surmise that the effect of the acquirer’s favorability of 
their partners becomes are more salient if they do not have sufficient 
information on the target. For instance, if an acquirer lacks knowledge of the 
particular industry of the target, it would tend to base its evaluation of the 
target on more subjective criteria; in turn, favorability of its partner’s 
national identity would become more salient in the decision-making process. 
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Previous research on diversification indicates that firms have greater, 
in-depth knowledge on their own industries or related industries than 
unrelated industries (Ansoff, 1965; Lecraw, 1984; Singh & Montgomery, 
1987). Drawing from this literature, we focus on the industry-level 
relatedness to approximate the degree of information asymmetricity 
between the two firms. In other words, two acquisition partners in the same 
or related industries would have lower information asymmetricity; those in 
unrelated industries would have higher information asymmetricity. As such, 
we offer the following set of hypotheses on the information asymmetricity 
of acquisition partners as the moderator. 
 
Hypothesis 4a: Information asymmetricity strengthens the 
relationship between a favorability of an acquirer and acquisition 
premium. 
 
Hypothesis 4b: Information asymmetricity strengthens the 
relationship between a favorability of a target and acquisition 
premium. 
 
 The summary of the theoretical framework is shown on Figure 1 















Figure 2. Illustration of the Theory 
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The paper analyzed all cases of cross-border acquisitions available 
on SDC Platinum (M&A) database between 2007 and 2013. In addition, we 
relied on the BBC’s Country Ratings Survey Report to measure the favorability 
of the acquirers and target firms hold against each other which made all 
acquirers (and their respective targets) from countries that were considered 
in the BBC surveys become our focal sample firms of this paper. Therefore, 
cross-border acquisitions that consist of acquirers and target firms from the 
following 38 countries were used for the empirical analysis: Argentina, 
Australia, Australia, Brazil, Canada, Chile, China, Egypt, France, Germany, 
Ghana, Greece, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Iran, Israel, Italy, Japan, Kenya, 
Lebanon, Mexico, Nigeria, Pakistan, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, 
Russia, South Africa, South Korea, Spain, Thailand, Turkey, UAE, UK, US, 
and Venezuela. 
The SDC Platinum (M&A) database considers a within-border 
acquisition as a cross-border acquisition if a domestic firm with a foreign 
parent company acquires another domestic firm. As such cases can be seen 
as indirect cross-paper acquisitions, we also considered them as cross-
border M&A’s while noting and controlling for such indirect effect with a 
dummy variable called, “indirect cross-border acquisition.” In sum, after 
listwise deletions of missing values, we collected all aforementioned 
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acquisition cases that are available on the database from year 2007 to 2013; 
in total, 435 acquisition cases fit the description.  
 
3.2 Dependent Variable 
Acquisition Premium. Our study analyzes the effect of acquisition 
parties’ sentiments toward the national identities of their partners on 
acquisition premium paid. As such, our dependent variable was the amount 
of acquisition premium paid. We measured the acquisition premium using 
the data for “Premium 4 weeks prior to announcement date” on SDC 
Platinum (M&A) database since it captures the acquisition premium in each 
transaction in a consistent matter. The variable was measured by the 
percentage difference between an acquisition deal’s bid price per share paid 
by the acquirer and the target firm’s stock price four weeks prior to 
announcement date (Haunschild, 1994). We measured the natural log of the 
acquisition premium to better interpret our analysis. 
 
3.3 Independent Variable 
Favorability. To measure the degree of favorability acquirers and 
target firms hold toward each other in terms of their nationality, we relied 
on the data from BBC, Globescan and PIPA’s Country Ratings Survey Report. 
The report surveys 1,000 respondents annually from the general public of 
each country regarding their perspectives on the influence of other countries 
in the sample. By inquiring about the influence of the foreign countries, 
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encompassing all facets of the nation including socio-economic and cultural 
dimensions, the survey generates a comprehensive and reliable data, and 
has constantly been used in diverse areas of political science research to 
capture favorability and public opinions of each country, as well as its ‘soft 
power’ (Holyk, 2013; Hoodbhoy & Mian, 2014; Liu & Hao, 2014). More 
specifically, the survey organization gives a list of foreign nations to each 
respondent, and asked him/her to indicate whether s/he feels “favorable” or 
“unfavorable” toward each country. We then measured favorability scores by 
using the percentage of total responses marked as “favorable”. As the survey 
report is published annually, it was suitable for measuring the data for our 
time frame (2007-2013).  
 An alternative approach for measuring the relevant favorability in 
our study may have been direct surveys of top managers on how they view 
the other partner firms. Although it could have provided a more accurate 
data on perceived favorability, such direct survey possesses various 
potential problems as well. First of all, surveying top management team 
members retrospectively on how they had felt toward the target firm would 
be infeasible. Moreover, even if we were to conduct such survey, there is a 
high chance that the data may contain various types of biases. For example, 
knowing that their responses may be reviewed by a third party, top 
managers may dishonestly hide their unfavorable sentiments toward their 
acquisition partners’ national identities in order to signal others that their 
decisions were rational and logical. In addition, those who are willing to 
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complete the survey may have extreme stances on the survey questions, 
which can lead to self-selection bias. Hence, we chose to use the proxy 
survey of how average people of different nations view other countries 
instead.  
 
3.4 Moderating Variable 
 Based on extant research on industrial relatedness, we utilized the 
SIC codes of the two acquisition partners (Hayward & Hambrick, 1997; Keil, 
Maula, Schildt & Zahra, 2008). Although there have been some criticisms 
regarding utilization of the SIC codes to infer firms’ relatedness, it is the 
most systematic and effective methodology to study the firm-level 
industrial commonality (Markides & Williamson, 1996; McGahan, 2005; 
Villalonga, Haleblian & Finkelstein, 1999). We assumed that acquisition 
partners were unrelated if the first digit of the SIC Codes is not identical 
(Markides & Williamson, 1996).  
 
3.5 Control Variables 
In our analysis, we included four different categories of control 
variables. The first category is a group of control variables that depict 
financial attractiveness of target firms. This category consists of target firm’s 
net sales (Target Net Sales), after tax net income (Target Net Income), and 
profit margin for past twelve months from the acquisition announcement 
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date (Target Profit Margin), and net asset of target firms (Target Net Asset) 
(Hope et al, 2011).  
The second category describes the nature of the acquisition bid, 
which includes dummy variables for existence of tender offer (Tender Offer) 
(Comment & Schwert, 1995), competition during bidding process (Bidding 
Competition) (Giliberto & Varaiya, 1989; Slusky & Caves, 1991) and 
completion of the deal (Completion Status). Each variable was given a value 
of 1 if the acquisition case had a tender offer, more than one bidder, or a 
completed deal status without a withdrawal from the deal.  
The third category denotes the characteristics at the acquirer-level: 
the percentages of target firm’s shares sought by the acquirer (Shares Sought); 
a dummy variable on whether the acquirer had hostile or unfriendly bid 
during the bidding process (Hostile Bid); and a dummy variable on whether 
the acquirer was a financial institution (Financial Institution Acquirer) (Hope 
et al, 2011).  
The last category of control variables controls for other remaining 
factors that influence acquisition premium: an indirect cross-border 
acquisition (Indirect Cross-Border Acquisition), neutrality (or absence) of 
sentiment towards the acquisition partner’s national identity (Acquirer's 
Neutrality & Target's Neutrality), and year effects of our sample’s timeframe 
(2007-2013) (Year Control). The indirect cross-border acquisition variable is a 
dummy variable that indicates whether an acquisition case is an indirect 
acquisition of a domestic firm by a domestic acquirer, which has a foreign 
21 
parent company. In addition, we had to recognize those cases where 
acquisition parties do not hold any significant sentiment toward their 
partners’ national identities. By default, firms possess propensity to conduct 
expand through cross-border acquisitions (Wilson, 1980). Therefore, we also 
controlled for the neutrality (or absence) of sentiment by calculating the 




All cross-border acquisition cases available in the SDC platinum 
amounted to 435 cases, after list-wise deletion of missing values. We first 
made a random distribution assumption of the samples and utilized the 
ordinary least squares regression analysis to test the initial hypotheses. By 
constructing different versions of empirical model, we analyzed different 
versions of control variables and interaction effects between the two sides’ 
favorable sentiment toward the other.  
 
4. Results 
The paper empirically tested the abovementioned analysis with 
different sets of control variables and independent variables to test the 
proposed hypotheses. Statistical values for each research model are shown 
on the following statistical tables. The Variance Inflation Factors (VIF) of all 
22 
the variables in every model were lower than 2.00. As a result, we assumed 
that there was no problem of multicollinearity in all the models of the paper. 
 
 






Log (Premium 4 Weeks) 3.696 0.948 435 
Target Net Sales 893.502 2802.505 435 
Target Net Income 34.059 153.614 435 
Target Profit Margin -18.347 840.299 435 
Target Net Asset 492.559 1538.957 435 
Tender Offer 0.460 0.499 435 
Bidding Competition 0.110 0.319 435 
Completion Status 0.870 0.340 435 
Shares Sought 85.703 27.737 435 
Hostile Bid 0.030 0.164 435 
Finance Industrya 0.030 0.157 435 
Indirect Cross-Border  0.360 0.479 435 
Neutralitya 2.833 0.537 435 
Neutralityt 2.775 0.482 435 
Favorabilitya 3.915 0.379 435 
Favorabilityt 3.890 0.350 435 
Info Asymmetricitya 1.723 1.981 435 




Table 2. Pearson Correlations 
Variable 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 
1. Log (Premium 
4 Weeks) 1.00                  
2. Target Net 
Sales -0.07 1.00                 
3. Target Net 
Income -0.11 0.54 1.00                
4. Target Profit 
Margin 0.03 0.01 0.03 1.00               
5. Target Net 
Asset -0.08 0.60 0.53 0.00 1.00              
6. Tender Offer -0.00 -0.05 0.04 -0.02 -0.03 1.00             
7. Bidding 
Competition 0.13 0.12 0.05 0.00 0.03 -0.07 1.00            
8. Completion 
Status -0.03 -0.10 -0.07 -0.08 -0.04 0.21 -0.30 1.00           
9. Shares Sought 0.14 -0.03 0.03 0.00 -0.01 -0.09 0.13 -0.07 1.00          




-0.04 -0.02 -0.05 0.00 -0.03 -0.09 0.08 0.02 0.04 -0.03 1.00        
12. Indirect 
Cross-Border  0.01 -0.03 -0.02 0.02 -0.04 0.25 -0.01 0.17 0.04 -0.13 -0.03 1.00       
13. Neutralitya 0.05 -0.01 -0.03 -0.04 0.02 0.19 -0.02 0.03 -0.13 -0.03 -0.12 -0.04 1.00      
14. Neutralityb -0.10 0.04 -0.01 -0.04 0.00 0.10 -0.07 0.04 -0.25 -0.01 -0.08 0.01 0.28 1.00     
15. Favorabilitya -0.06 0.04 0.00 -0.04 0.01 -0.04 0.03 -0.01 0.03 0.04 0.02 0.06 -0.40 -0.19 1.00    
16. Favorabilityt -0.03 -0.09 0.02 0.06 0.00 -0.07 -0.01 0.06 0.24 0.05 0.03 0.00 -0.01 -0.22 -0.14 1.00   
17. Info 
Asymmetricitya 
0.03 0.00 0.01 0.08 -0.03 0.12 -0.08 0.10 -0.10 -0.06 0.16 0.31 -0.12 -0.07 0.18 -0.06 1.00  
18. Info 
Asymmetricityt 




Table 3. Results of Regression (Basic Main Effects) 
 
Standard Errors in Parentheses 
+ p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Intercept 3.396*** 6.179*** 5.080 
 (0.505) (1.183) (4.308) 
Target Net Sales 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Target Net Income -0.001+ -0.001+ -0.001+ 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Target Profit Margin 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Target Net Asset 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Tender Offer 0.014 0.033 0.032 
 (0.102) (0.102) (0.103) 
Competition During  0.346* 0.337* 0.337* 
Bidding Process (0.151) (0.150) (0.150) 
Completion Status 0.054 0.090 0.090 
 (0.151) (0.151) (0.151) 
Shares Sought 0.004** 0.005** 0.005** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Hostile Bid 0.084 0.138 0.140 
 (0.299) (0.298) (0.298) 
Finance Industry Acquirer -0.405 -0.406 -0.407 
 (0.290) (0.289) (0.289) 
Indirect  0.015 0.026 0.027 
Cross-Border Acquisition (0.099) (0.099) (0.099) 
Neutralitya 0.122 0.042 0.038 
 (0.092) (0.101) (0.102) 
Neutralityt -0.180+ -0.265* -0.266* 
 (0.111) (0.115) (0.022) 
Year Control Yes Yes  Yes 
    
Favorabilitya (H1)  -0.300* 0.005 
  (0.145) (1.159) 
Favorabilityt (H2)  -0.299* 0.005 
  (0.144) (1.155) 
Favorabilitya   -0.083 
X  Favorabilityt (H3)   (0.313) 
N 435 435 435 
Model Sig 0.019 0.006 0.009 




Table 4. Results of Regression (Moderating Effect)
Variable Model 4 Model 5 
Intercept 6.130*** 6.151*** 
 (1.181) (1.181) 
Target Net Sales 0.000 0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
Target Net Income -0.001* -0.001* 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
Target Profit Margin 0.000 0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
Target Net Asset 0.000 0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
Tender Offer 0.022 0.025 
 (0.102) (0.102) 
Competition During  0.357* 0.352* 
Bidding Process (0.150) (0.150) 
Completion Status 0.085 0.088 
 (0.151) (0.151) 
Shares Sought 0.005** 0.005* 
 (0.002) (0.002) 
Hostile Bid 0.145 0.025 
 (0.297) (0.102) 
Finance Industry Acquirer -0.499+ -0.489+ 
 (0.293) (0.294) 
Indirect  -0.023 -0.016 
Cross-Border Acquisition (0.103) (0.103) 
Neutralitya 0.048 23246 
 (0.101) (0.101) 
Neutralityt -0.253 -0.254* 
 (0.115) (0.115) 
Year Control Yes Yes 
   
Favorabilitya (H1) -0.333* -0.315* 
 (0.146) (0.145) 
Favorabilityt (H2) -0.288* -0.344* 
 (0.146) (0.147) 
Favorabilitya     0.043+  
X  Info Asymmetricitya (H4a) (0.025)  
Favorabilityt 
X  Info Asymmetricityt (H4b) 
 0.037 (0.025) 
N 435 435 
Model Sig 0.004 0.005 
Adjusted R2 0.050 0.048 
Standard Errors in Parentheses   




The Table 3 and 4 show regression coefficients for the various 
models. The Model 1 includes just the control variables while the other 
models added the other independent, interaction, and moderating variables 
testing the hypotheses. The significance levels for the all five models are 
below 5%, indicating that they were all statistically significant. As shown in 
the Table 3 and 4, the empirical analyses confirmed some of our hypotheses, 
while for others the opposite results emerged.  
Since we utilized the log of acquisition premia as our dependent 
variable, we can interpret the coefficients of the Table 3 and 4 as the amount 
of percentage changes of acquisition premia when the independent or 
control variables change by one unit. Our independent variables indicate 
percentages of people who are favorable of each specific foreign country. 
Therefore, we can interpret the coefficients of the independent variables as 
the amount of percentage changes of acquisition premia when the numbers 
of people who are favorable of a particular foreign nation change by one 
percent. Using such method of interpretation, our analyses effectively tested 
our initial hypotheses and showed several significant results. 
First of all, as shown in the Model 2 of the Table 3, the results show 
that a target firm’s favorability of the acquirers significantly decreases 
acquisition premia. Thus, Hypothesis 2 was supported. The results show 
that an acquisition premium is more dependent on a target’s favorability 
towards the acquirer rather than the other determinants from previous 




income of the target firms. In short, we can interpret such result by arguing 
that favorability of acquirers’ national identities is negatively associated 
with acquisition premia. Such tendency can be seen as the preference of the 
target firms to encounter and be associated with acquirers from nations with 
greater subjective favorability.  
Although the Hypothesis 2, was strongly supported, other findings 
were inconsistent with the Hypothesis 1, which tested the effects of the 
acquirer’s favorability towards the target. According to the results on the 
Model 2 of the Table 3, an acquirer’s favorability towards the target is 
negatively associated with acquisition premia. Therefore, Hypothesis 1 was 
not supported. 
As the Model 3 in Table 3 shows, the hypothesized interaction 
effects at the dyadic level were not found to be significant. While the model 
itself was statistically significant at 5% level, the regression coefficients of 
the interaction terms failed to reach significance. According to the Model 3, 
the interaction effect between acquirers and targets in terms of their 
favorability toward each other was statistically not significant. Therefore, 
the Hypothesis 3, which predicted an interaction effect between the 
sentiments of two acquisition partners, was not confirmed. 
If we look at Model 4 and 5 in Table 4, the empirical analysis 
marginally confirmed that acquirer’s favorability of its target firm’s national 
identity has more salient effect as it lacks knowledge of its target firm’s 




target firm’s perspective. According to the model, an acquirer relies more 
heavily on its sentiment toward the target’s national identity when deciding 
the cost of acquisition, if it is not familiar with the target firm’s industry or 
business. Summary of the empirical analysis is shown on Figure 3. 
 
Figure 3. Illustration of the Actual Result 
= Premium Level / Acquirer à Target 
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5. Discussion and Conclusion 
The results of our study offer a number of theoretical insights. First 
of all, our results show that target firms tend to accept lower acquisition 
premia from acquirers with more appealing national identity. Such results 
support the notion that the perception of the target firms in the context of 
the acquirers’ national identities does matter in cross-border acquisitions. 
All in all, favorability of the target’s national identity significantly 




acquisition. In fact, considering the significant role of attitudes toward 
national identities on acquisition premia, the findings of our study also 
suggest the possibilities of such perception in other firm-level outcomes.  
Furthermore, although we had predicted in Hypothesis 1 a positive 
relationship between an acquirer’s favorable sentiment toward the target 
and the acquisition premium, our results indicate that the opposite is true. 
In other words, the level of favorability the acquirer holds toward the target 
firm is actually negatively related to acquisition premia in cross-border 
M&A’s. Such unexpected finding seems to arise from a complex interplay of 
various sentiments. In fact, it suggests that we may need to consider the 
notion of ‘national pride’ (Hope, 2011) to explicate the phenomenon of 
acquirers’ higher payment of premia to target firms with unfavorable 
sentiment. In their recent study, Hope et al (2011) found that when 
acquiring firms show signs of national pride, they tend to bid higher during 
acquisition deals. In other words, under a significant level of national pride 
or patriotism, acquiring a target firm from a country with strongly negative 
historical ties may pose irrational motivation in undertaking the transaction. 
As a result, the firm may be motivated to pay greater premium to acquire 
the target with unfavorable national identities in order to fulfill its 
nationalistic motivations, for instance. 
By empirically examining the moderating effect of information 
asymmetricity, we also confirmed the last hypothesis that the effect of 




the target firm. Such finding is consistent with previous literatures on 
psychology which argue that propensity of association is more prominent if 
they lack knowledge of a subject (Hong & Wyer, 1989; Huber & McCann, 
1982; Olson, 1977). However, we did not find such moderating effect from 
the perspective of target firms. The absence of the moderating effect may be 
due to the nature of the target firms’ role in the acquisition process. During 
the acquisition process, it is mostly the acquirer that actively searches and 
identifies its possible acquisition partner (Benson & Shippy, 2013). In 
addition, as acquisition premium can only be finalized as the acquirer has 
the willingness and ability to pay the negotiated price, the evaluation and 
decision-making process of the acquirer seems more critical when 
determining acquisition premia compared to those of the target. Thus, the 
decision-making process would be more involved and complex for the 
acquirers than the targets.  
The findings of our study also shed light on organizational 
decision-making processes in the context of M&A’s. We find that in addition 
to the accounting-based assessment of a target firm, acquisition parties seem 
to rely on subjective and idiosyncratic way of valuating their partner firms. 
Specifically, national identities, in fact, were found to substantially influence 
the firms willingness to pay or accept acquisition premia, which can 
potentially determine their post-acquisition performance (Krishnan, Hitt & 




findings of this study offer yet another evidence on the bounded nature of 
organizational decision-making.  
 
6. Limitations and Suggestions for the Future 
Studies 
The favorability ratings this paper utilized are from surveys that 
targeted the entire population of each country. As a result, such favorability 
may not be completely applicable to the top managers of each individual 
company that hold decision-making power. Considering how such 
management groups are just narrow subgroups in each population, a 
survey targeting the general population of each country may not portray 
completely accurate information on the top managers of large public 
corporations. Nevertheless, distributing surveys directly to the top 
managers that actually made the decisions on the acquisition is, first of all, 
infeasible. In addition, asking the managers regarding the questions about 
their stereotypes and sentiments toward other countries during and after 
the acquisitions may contain substantial bias given their sensitive nature. 
Therefore, we felt that the data from the national-level survey were the most 
efficient, reliable and practical source for the purpose of this study. 
However, future research on this topic may want to incorporate a 
lab-based study measuring how decision-makers with varying sentiments 




M&A cases. It is hoped that this paper would provide impetus for future 
studies on this important topic examining the effects of national-level 





Agrawal, A., Jaffe, J. F. & Mandelker, G. N. 1992. The post-merger 
performance of acquiring firms: A reexamination of an anomaly. 
Journal of Finance, 47(4): 1605-1621. 
Aguilera, R. V. & Dencker, J. C. 2004. The role of human resource 
management in cross-border mergers and acquisitions. International 
Journal of Human Resource Management, 15(8): 1355–1370. 
Alexandridis, G., Fuller, K. P., Terhaar, L. & Travlos, N. G. 2013. Deal size, 
acquisition premia and shareholder gains. Journal of Corporate 
Finance, 20: 1-13. 
Ansoff, H. I. 1965. Corporate Strategy. McGraw-Hill, New York. 
Armstrong, A., 2015, “Dealmakers toast best start to the year since 2007 
M&A boom.” The Telegraph: April 1, 2015. 
Bauer, F. & Matzler, K. 2014. Antecedents of M&A success: The role of 
strategic complementarity, cultural fit, and degree and speed of 
integration. Strategic Management Journal. 35(2): 269-291. 
Beckman, C. M. & Haunschild, P. R. 2002. Network Learning: The Effects of 
Partners’ Heterogeneity of Experience on Corporate Acquisitions. 
Administrative Science Quarterly, 47: 92-124. 
Benson, M. C. & Shippy, J. S. 2013. The M&A Buy Side Process: An 




BBC World Service poll, Globescan, PIPA. 2010. Positive vs. Negative views 
regarding the influence of various countries. BBC World. 
Bilkey, W. J. & Nes, E. 1982. Country-of-origin effects on product 
evaluations. Journal of International Business Studies, 13: 89-99. 
Birnbaum, M. 2015. “Russia’s anti-American fever goes beyond Soviet era’s.” 
The Washington Post: March 8th, 2015. 
Björkman, I., Stahl, G. K. & Vaara, E. 2007. Cultural differences and 
capability transfer in cross-border acquisitions: The mediating roles 
of capability complementarity, absorptive capacity, and social 
integration. Journal of International Business Studies, 38(4): 658-672. 
Bräutigam, D. & Xiaoyang, T. 2012. Economic statecraft in China’s new 
overseas special economic zones: soft power, business or resource 
security? International Affairs. 88(4): 799-816. 
Buch, C. M. & DeLong, G. 2004. Cross-border bank mergers: What lures the 
rare animal? Journal of Banking and Finance, 28(9): 2077-2102. 
Carroll, C., Griffith, J. M. & Rudolph, P. M. 1999. Hostile-vs.-white knight 
bidders. Managerial and Decision Economics, 20(3): 163-171. 
Celsi, L. R. & Olson, J. C. 1988. The Role of Involvement in Attention and 
Comprehension Processes. Journal of Consumer Research, 15(2): 210-
224. 
Chakrabarti, R., Gupta-Mukherjee, S. & Jayaraman, N. 2009. Mars–Venus 
marriages: Culture and cross-border M&A. Journal of International 




Comment, R. & Schwert, G. W. 1995. Poison or placebo? Evidence on the 
deterrence and wealth effects of modern antitakeover measures. 
Journal of Financial Economics, 39(1): 3-43. 
Datta, D. K. 1991. Organizational fit and acquisition performance: Effects of 
post-acquisition integration. Strategic Management Journal, 12(4): 281-
297. 
Datta, D. K. & Puia, G. 1995. Cross-Border Acquisitions: An Examination of 
the Influence of Related and Cultural Fit on Shareholder Value. 
Management International Review, 5: 255-264. 
Datta, M. N. (2009). The Decline of America’s soft power in the United 
Nations1. International Studies Perspectives, 10(3), 265-284. 
Ellis, K. M., Reus, T. H., Lamont, B. T. & Ranft, A. L. 2011. Transfer effects in 
large acquisitions: How size-specific experience matters. Academy of 
Management Journal, 54: 1261-1276. 
Empson, L. 2004. Organizational identity change: managerial regulation and 
member identification in an accounting firm acquisition. 
Organizations and Society, 29(8): 759-781. 
Ghemawat, P., 2001. Distance still matters: the hard reality of global 
expansion. Harvard Business Review, 79(8): 137- 147 
Giliberto S. M. & Varaiya N. P. 1989. The winner’s curse and bidder 
competition in acquisitions: evidence from failed bank auctions. 
Journal of Finance, 44(1): 59-75. 





Gürhan-Canli, Z. & Maheswaran, D. 2000. Cultural variations in country of 
origin effects. Journal of Marketing Research, 37(3): 309-317. 
Haleblian, J. & Finkelstein, S. 1999. The influence of organizational 
acquisition experience on acquisition performance: a behavioral 
learning perspective. Administrative Science Quarterly, 44(1): 29-56. 
Hammond, E., Baigorri, M. & Browning, J. 2015. Takeover Boom Seen 
Fueled by Strong Dollar, Hunt for Growth.” Bloomberg Business: 
April 1, 2015. 
Han, C. M. & Terpstra, V. 1988. Country-of-origin effects for uni-national 
and bi-national products. Journal of International Business Studies 19: 
235-255. 
Haunschild, P. R. 1994. How Much is That Company Worth?: 
Interorganizational Relationships, Uncertainty, and Acquisition 
Premiums. Administrative Science Quarterly, 39: 391-411. 
Hayward, M. L. & Hambrick, D. C. 1997. Explaining the Premiums Paid for 
Large Acquisitions: Evidence of CEO Hubris. Administrative Science 
Quarterly, 42: 103-127. 
Hofstede, G., Neuijen, B., Ohayv, D. D. & Sanders G. 1990. Measuring 
organizational cultures: A qualitative and quantitative study across 
twenty cases. Administrative Science Quarterly, 35: 286-316.  
Holyk, G.G., 2011. Paper tiger? Chinese Soft Power in East Asia. Political 





Hoodbhoy, P. & Mian, Z., Nuclear fears, hopes and realities in Pakistan. 
International Affairs, 90(5): 1125-1142. 
Hong, S. & Wyer, R. S. 1990. Determinants of product evaluation: effects of 
the time interval between knowledge of a product’s country of 
origin and information about its specific attributes. Journal of 
Consumer Research, 17: 277-288. 
Hong, S. & Wyer, R. S. 1989. Effects of country-of-origin and product 
attribute information on product evaluation: An information 
processing perspective. Journal of Consumer Research, 16(2): 175-187 
Hope, O., Thomas, W. & Vyas, D. 2011. The cost of pride: Why do firms 
fromdeveloping countries bid higher? Journal of International 
Business Studies, 42: 128–151. 
Huber, J. & McCann, J. 1982. The impact of inferential beliefs on product 
evaluations. Journal of Marketing Research, 19: 324-333. 
Keil, T., Maula, M., Schildt, H. & Zahra S. A. 2008. The effect of governance 
modes and relatedness of external business development activities 
on innovative performance. Strategic Management Journal, 29: 895-
907. 
Kim, J., Haleblian, J. & Finkelstein, S. 2011. When firms are desperate to 
grow via acquisition: The effect of growth patterns and acquisition 
experience on acquisition premiums. Administrative Science 




Kitching, J. 1967. Why do mergers miscarry? Harvard Business Review, 45: 
84–101. 
Kiyamaz, H., 2004, Cross-border acquisitions of US financial institutions: 
Impact of macroeconomic factors. Journal of Banking & Finance, 28(6): 
1435-1439. 
Kusewitt, J. B. 1985. An exploratory study of strategic acquisition factors 
relating to performance. Strategic Management Journal, 6(2): 151–169. 
Krishnan, H. A., Hitt, M. A. & Park, D. 2007. Acquisition premiums, 
subsequent workforce reductions and post-acquisition performance. 
Journal of Management Studies, 44(5): 709-732. 
Krishnan, H., Miller, A. & Judge, W. 1997. Diversification and top 
management team complementarity: Is performance improved by 
merging similar or dissimilar teams? Strategic Management Journal, 
18: 361-374. 
Krug, J. A. & Hegarty, W. H. 1997. Postacquisition turnover among US top 
management teams: An analysis of the effects of foreign vs. 
domestic acquisitions of US targets. Strategic Management Journal, 
18(8): 667-675. 
Laamanen, T. 2007. On the role of acquisition premium in acquisition 
research. Strategic Management Journal, 28(13): 1359-1369. 
Larsson, R. & Finkelstein, S. 1999. Integrating strategic, organizational, and 
human resource perspectives on mergers and acquisitions: A case 




Lecraw, D.J. 1984. Diversification strategy and performance. Journal of 
Industrial Economics, 33(2): 179-198. 
Lee, S. H., Shenkar, O. & Li, J. 2008. Cultural distance, investment flow, and 
control in cross-border cooperation. Strategic Management Journal. 
29(10): 1117-1125. 
Liu, W. & Hao, Y. 2014. Australia in China’s Grand Strategy. Asian Survey, 
54(2): 367-394. 
Lubatkin, M. 1983. Mergers and the performance of the acquiring firm. 
Academy of Management Review, 8: 218-225. 
Maheswaran, D. 1994. Country of Origin as a stereotype: Effects of 
consumer expertise and attribute strength on product evaluations. 
Journal of Consumer Research, 21: 354-365. 
Maheswaran, D. & Chen, C. 2008. Nation Equity: Incidental emotions in 
country-of-origin effects. Journal of Consumer Research, 33: 370-376 
Malatesta, P. H., Walking, R., A. 1988. Poison pill securities: Stockholder 
wealth, profitability, and ownership structure. Journal of Financial 
Economics, 20: 347-376. 
Markides, C. C. & Williamson, P. J. 1996. Corporate diversification and 
organizational structure: a resource-based view. Academy of 





Morosini, P., Shane, S. & Singh, H. 1998. National Cultural Distance and 
Cross-Border Acquisition Performance. Journal of International 
Business Studies, 29: 137-158. 
Murphy, C. 2014. “VW Drives for Gains in Southern China,” Wall Street 
Journal. 
Niden, C. M. 1993. An empirical examination of white knight corporate 
takeovers: Synergy and Overbidding. Financial Management, 22: 28-
45. 
Nielsen, J. & Melicher, W. 1973. A Financial Analysis of Acquisition and 
Merger Premium. Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 8(2): 
139-148. 
Nye, J. 2004. Soft Power: The Means to Succeed in World Politics. New York: 
Public Affairs. 
Pasquali, V., Value of Cross-border M&A by Region and Country. Global 
Finance Magazine August 22, 2012. 
Paradise, J. F. 2009. China and international harmony: The role of Confucius 
institutes in bolstering Beijing’s Soft Power. Asian Survey, 49(4): 647-
669. 
Park, S. S. 2014. “Anti-hallyu voices growing in Japan.” Korea Times: 
February 21st, 2014. 
Peterson, R. A. & Jolibert, A. J. 1995. A meta-analysis of country-of-origin 




Reus, T. H. & Lamont, B. T. 2009. The double-edged sword of cultural 
distance in international acquisitions. Journal of International Business 
Studies. 40: 1298-1316. 
Roth, M. S. & Romeo, J. B. 1992. Matching Product Category and Country 
Image Perceptions: A Framework for Managing Country-Of-Origin 
Effects. Journal of International Business Studies. 23: 477-497. 
Shelton, L. 2000. Merger market dynamics: insight into the behavior of 
target and bidder firms. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 
41(4): 363-383. 
Shenkar, O. 2001. Cultural distance revisited: Towards a more rigorous 
conceptualization and measurement of cultural differences. Journal 
of International Business Studies. 32(3): 519-535. 
Shimizu, K., Hitt, M., Vaidyanath, D. & Pisano, V. 2004. Theoretical 
foundations of cross-border mergers and acquisitions: a review of 
current research and recommendations for the future. Journal of 
International Management, 10(3): 307-353. 
Shleifer, A. & Vishny, R. 2003. Stock market driven acquisitions. Journal of 
Financial Economics, 70(3): 295-311. 
Singh, H. & Montgomery, C. A. 1987. Corporate acquisition strategies and 
economic performance. Strategic Management Journal, 8(4):377-386 
Sirower, M. L. 1997. The synergy trap: How companies lose the acquisition game: 




Slusky, A. & Caves, R. 1991. Synergy, agency, and the determinants of 
premia paid in mergers. The Journal of Industrial Economics, 39: 277-
296. 
Trautwein, F. 2006. Merger motives and merger prescriptions. Strategic 
Management Journal, 11(4): 283-295. 
Trachtenberg, J. A., Meinbardis, R. A. & Hiller, D. B. 1990. “Buy-out bomb: 
An extra $500 million paid for Federated got Compeau into trouble.” 
Wall Street Journal. 
Tushman, M. & Romanelli, E. 1985. Organizational evolution: A 
metamorphosis model of convergence and reorientation. Research in 
Organizational Behavior, 7: 171–222. 
Varaiya, N. P. &Ferris, K. P. 1987. Overpaying in corporate takeovers: The 
winner’s curse. Financial Analysts Journal, 43: 64-70. 
Varaiya, N. P. 1987. Determinants of premiums in acquisition transactions. 
Managerial and Decision Economics, 8(3): 175-184. 
Villalonga, B. & McGahan, A., M. 2005. The choice among acquisitions, 
alliances, and divestitures. Strategic Management Journal, 26(13): 
1183-1208. 
Walking, R. A. & Edmister, R. O. 1985. Determinants of Tender Offer 
Premiums. Financial Analysts Journal, 41(1): 27-37. 
Weitzel, U. & Berns, S. 2006. Cross-Border Takeovers, Corruption, and 
Related Aspects of Governance. Journal of International Business 




Wilson, B. D. 1980. The Propensity of Multinational Companies to Expand 
Through Acquisitions. Journal of International Business Studies, 11: 59-
65. 
Wiersema, M. F. & Bantel, K. A. 1992. Top management team demography 







국 문 초 록 
국경 간 인수합병에서 상대기업 호감도가  
인수 프리미엄에 미치는 영향 
 
본 논문은 국경 간 인수합병에서 상대기업의 국적에 대한 
호감도와 인수 프리미엄의 상관관계를 연구하였다. 38 개의 국적을 가진 
기업들이 참여한 435 개의 국경 간 인수합병들을 분석한 결과, 본 
연구는 1) 인수 프리미엄과 인수 기업이 피인수 기업의 국적에 대해 
가지고 있는 호감도가 음의 상관관계를 가지고 있음을 발견하였다. 또한 
2) 인수 프리미엄과 피인수 기업이 인수 기업의 국적에 대해 가지고 
있는 호감도 또한 음의 상관관계를 가지고 있음을 알 수 있었다. 또한, 
인수합병에서 인수기업이 피인수 기업에 대한 지식이 부족할 경우 앞서 
언급한 피인수 기업의 국적에 대한 호감도와 인수 프리미엄의 관계를 
조절한다는 점을 발견할 수 있었다. 해당 논문은 특정 국가에 대한 
호감도가 기업의 인수합병 행태에 어떠한 영향을 주는지를 인수 
프리미엄을 통하여 분석한 첫 연구이다. 
 
주요어: 인수 프리미엄, 인수합병, 국경간 인수합병, 기업의 국적, 
상대기업 호감도 
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